Brigadier Hackett didn't intend that Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Smyth's battalion should make any major attack during the first phase of his brigade's operation. After spending the night near Brigade HQ at the Hotel Buundererkamp. the battalion set off at 4.30a.m making towards a road junction on the Amsterdamseweg where it was to 'occupy a firm base' to protect the left flank of the brigade's attack. The first three miles of the approach march were made without too much difficulty, and the battalion's destination was almost reached with no greater danger than some long-range machine-gun fire which caused few casualties, though with the disturbing experience of meeting a succession of jeeps bringing back casualties from the 156 Battalion's action.

The leading troops, Captain Cedric Horsfall's D Company reached the designated junction on the wide Amsterdamseweg by 10.a.m Ken Smyth did not stop there but continued on in the direction of Arnhem. There are several unexplained aspects of this further move. There is no record of why Smyth proceeded further; possibly an unrecorded wireless message from Brigadier Hackett encouraged him to do so. The battalion was thus approaching the next road junction, which was three-quarters of a mile closer to Arnhem, at the end of the Dreijenseweg near the hotel called the Leeren Doedel; but this was at the northern end of the German blocking line on the Dreijenseweg, and the battalion would have to fight for the next junction. The personal accounts of several soldiers show that they knew nothing of the 'occupy firm base' order but were under the impression that battalion was following the original brigade plan made in England and continuing along the main road to get to its originally allocated position north of Arnhem. D Company moved through the wooded ground on the south side of the road, passing a pumping station called La Cadine on the northern side of the road, and then it suddenly came under fire from the outpost of the German blocking line on the Dreijenseweg. The leading troops were approximately 300 yards short of the Leeren Doedel road junction.

What happened next was a typical example of what was now becoming a familar situation: the leading troops of an advancing until suddenly coming under heavy fire from weapons fired from unseen positions in the woods. First it was long bursts of machine-gun fire, then mortars, then armoured vehicles firing from mainly roads and tracks. The leading platoon went to ground and tried to return fire. The leading company commander tried to manoeuvre one of his other platoons to make an outflanking attack, but the men were fired upon as soon as they were exposed themselves, and, if the platoon did start a flanking attack, it found that the German line was so extensive that no further progress could be made. Battlaion HQ then assessed the situation and decided upon the next move. Lieutenant-Colonel des Voeux's response in the 156 Battalion's action a few hours earlier had been to call forward a further company and order it to repeat the attack, hoping that determined pressure would break the German defence; it had not and the company concerned had been ruined.

Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth proceeded more cautiously. He left D Company in contact with the Germans, carrying on a prolonged fire-fight, and sent observes from the Intelligence Section forward in an attempt to establish the exact whereabouts of the German positions and then being his 3-inch Mortar Platoon into action. He sent a message to Brigade HQ asking whether he should commit his other companies in a wide flanking move, crossing the main road in strengh and trying to move forward through the woods on the north side of it. Permission was given, though this all took time. There was no artillery support, either because of the close country or because of signalling difficulties. There was no close air support, as would have been enjoyed in large numbers by coventional Allied ground troops, because the planners in England had made no detailed preparations for liaison with the fight-bomber squardrons availale at the forward arifields in Belgium. Many German fighters appeared during the day and supported their troops, a rare reversal of the air-support sitution in 1944. There would be no friendly tank support until XXX Corps arrived. Most of the disadvantages had been shared by other battalions attacking in the Arnhem battle, but the experience of 10th Battalion, brought to a halt here while making the 1st British Airborne Division's last major attempt to advance, highlights many of the shortcomings of the Arnhem operation: over-optimism about German defence capabilities, too distant dropping zones, and failure to employ over the battlefield the Allied air supremacy won at such cost in the earlier years of the war.

These are a few examples of incidents during the five hours that the 10th Battalion spent in the woods astride that wide road near the pumping station. Captain Nick Hanmer, the Adjutant, was well up behind the leading companys when the firing started:

We had been moving fairly quickly, and it happened suddenly. But it was what we would have expected that the leading company would be held up and then overcome the resistance,only they didn't overcome the resistance. The Germans had the usual MG-42s standard German light machine-gun, very fast firing, twice as fast as a Bren and of course there were tracked vehicles; you could hear the squealing of the tracks and engines noises, the Battalion HQ wasn't near enough to see them. That was a very fightening noise if you were a parachutist. The company ahead may have tried to outflank the opposition I don't know but the fire was so heavy that they had to dig in, and so did we. You dig rather quickly in those circumstances. Quite a lot of fire was coming through to us. The CO couldn't do much at that stage because of the fire was so heavy. We were so close to the leading company that I actually saw one men shot. He was only six feet away from me. He was hit in the middle of his forehead and said 'Oh my God', as he went down.

Martin Middlebrook Arnhem 1944

 

Lieutenant John Procter, commander 9 Platoon in the leading company, was ordered to cross the main road and attempt an outflanking attack on the other side:

We had to get across the road first, but there was a self-propelled gun firing straight down it from time to time. It seemed fairly quiet, so we put one men across to see what it was like. The SP fired just then, and the shell blew the men's head off, a most unlucky shot for him. The rest of us lined up and galloped across without any more casualties. We had a lot of trouble then when their mortars opened up; the bombs were coming down just like rain. The whole ground was heaving; we though we had come on to a minefield. I was one of the first to be hit in the upper arm, breaking the bone. I was able to walk back to our own aid post. Battalion HQ was there also; they all laughed, which was a bit unkind; they knew that I was always getting shot up. This was the third time. The first was when I got shot in the stomach in a Crusader tank in North Africa; the second was when I was shot in the bottom in Italy.

Martin Middlebrook Arnhem 1944

Private George Taylor was Number Two on a Bren gun in No 8 Platoon, also D Company

We were held up by the Germans who were in some farm buildings. They had several Spandaus, and we kept exchanging fire with them. The barrel got do hot that we had to urinate on it to cool it down before we could change it. We were in shallow scrapes on the edge of a wood about fifty to seventy-five yards from the Germans and we evenually decided that we had to move out. It was just then that Nick Walter, Number One on the Bren was killed just one in the temple. I didn'teven know it was hit at first. I had to take the Bren from him and leave him; he was still in the firing position. That was the first time I had ever seen anyone dead. It all affected me very deeply; he was my best friend.

Another friend I lost that day was 'Taffy' Fifield. He had been engaged to a Land Army girl at Somerby where our camp was; she had asked me to look after him. When I went back to Somerby for the unveiling of the battalion's memorial plaque just after the war she was there. If looks could killed. I would been dead.

Martin Middlebrook Arnhem 1944

 

10th Battalion The Parachute Regiment War Diary. Take a close look at the names Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Smyth O.B.E Oosterbeek Cemetery 18. B. 8, Major C. F. Ashworth 5. D. 11 HQ Comp, Major P. A. R. Anson A Company Beckingham War Cemetery Germany 4. E. 14, Captain G. F. H. Drayson Medical Officer Oosterbeek Cemetery 15. B. 20, Captain L. E. Queripal VC Oosterbeek Cemetery A Company.

Captain C. M. Horsfall No Known Grave D Company, Captain J. M. Henry Intelligence Officer, H.Q. Company Oosterbeek Cemetery 5. D. 1, Lieutnant J. Howard No Known Grave, Lieutenant H. N. C. Radcliff Support Company, M.M.G. Officer Oosterbeek Cemetery 6. D. 1, Lieutenant P. W. A. Mackey killed with Sgt F. W.C. Bennett General Cemetery Ede row H, Grave 21, Lieutenant H. C. J. Roderick Brigade Liaison Office, H.Q. Company Oosterbeek Cemetery 5. B. 9, Lieutenant L. H. S. Kiaer A Company Oosterbeek Cemetery 19. C. 12, Lieutenant W. D. A. Burgess A Company Oosterbeek Cemetery 26. A. 6, Lieutenant P. A. Saunders D Company Oosterbeek Cemetery Cemtery 27. A. 6, Lieutenant R. G. W. Dodd Support Company, 3inch Mortar Platoon Officer Oosterbeek Cemetery 25. A. 15,. Note all the Officers 1 Commanding Officer, 2 Major's, 4 Captains, 8 Lieutenants. 15 Officers of The 10th Battalion killed at Arnhem.

 

 

The battalion's transport had come up to the main road when the action started. Lieutenant- Colonel Smyth's jeep, being driven by Captain Barry Murdoch, a glider pilot, was nosing carefully out on the wide road but was immediately hit by a self-propelled gun firing from further up the road. No one was hurt, but the jeep burst into frames, and the kits of several officers were lost. The incident undoubtedly deterred the attached anti-tank troop from attempting the same thing when they were later requested to deploy a gun to tackle the German armour on the road. Another vehicle in the transport column to be affected was a commandeered horsa and cart loaded with reserve ammunition and radio batteries which bolted with its signalman driver when the mortar bombs started to drop close by.

Cororal Harry Dicken at Battalion HQ, describes how Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth to a message that a coloumn of enemy vehicles was approching from the direction of Arnhem:

We were told Battalion HQ at least to line the road to ambush them but not to fire until ordered. The enemy stopped short of the wood, spread out and began to plaster us with every weapon they had. I was about ten yards from Colonel Smyth in this action; I was the only one left at HQ in the Intelligence Section, the others having been sent forward to find out what was happening. From my position I could see across the road to a two-storey pumping station with a tiled roof. While we were looking in this direction, there was a double explosion, and the tiled roof lifted, and over a period of almost a minute the tiles cascaded to the ground. Colonel Smyth drily remarked, 'The landlord won't like that.

Martin Middlebrook Arnhem 1944

The battalion's 3- inch mortars came into action and were successful in dampening the German Opposition, but only for as long as the ammunction lasted. Permission had meanwhile come from Brigade HQ for one company to attempt a much wider flanking movement. This was A Company, now led by its second in command, Captain Lionel Queripel, because the company commander was still south of the Rhine after his parachute aircraft was shot down. The exact details of the company's progress are not easy to establish; there was no written report, and not one officer of the company survived the next few days. Two men have provided personal accounts. Corporal 'Ginger' Elliott says that much of the company was inactive on the north side of the road for so long that he was able to get some from a Dutch poeple at the pumping station and amke a brew of tea. Private 'Jacko'Jackson, who should have been in detention in England for twice going absent in one week but had been allowed to come on the operation through the good officers of Captian Queripel, tells how he went on a three-men patrol further along the road led by Sergeant 'Tex' Banwell, discovered five tanks, two supply trucks and two fuel tankers in a compound beyond the pumping station and only narrowly escaped from a German patrol which nearly cut them off. Captain Queripel later ordered a company attack which met heavy opposition, and little progress was made. Queripel was slightly wounded in the face and personally carried a wounded sergeant back across the main road.

That was the last purely offensive British action of the Battle of Arnhem. All attacks carried out during the remainder of the battle were counter-attacks to regain lost defensive position. It was probably early afternoon, cerainly brfore 3.0.p.m. The 10 Battalion's casualties during that frusting five-hour action had not been heavy. About twelve killed; the wounded were nearly all treated and evacuated safely by Battalion MO, Captian Garth Drayson, known to his friends as 'Gremlin', but would be killed later in that day.

The Kings Own Scottish Borderers ground Johannahoeve Farm and LZ-L. on which a landing by gliders carrying the Polish anti-tank guns was expected during the day, and minour units of Hackett's brigade also had a relatively quiet morning. All suffered from the wide-ranging German fighter stafing, but there were few casualties Brigade HQ was dug in among some trees near the railway line, Lieuthenant George Paull's 17-pounder anti-tank troop was nearby, its four guns were all with battalions. The headquarters staff wes functioning normally, and Hackett was probably enjoying deploying his brigade, at least until news of the reverses to his two parachute battalions arrived. The sappers of the 4th Parachute Squardron were located near the railway line between Brigade HQ and Wolfheze. The squardron was providing the rear protection for the brigade, because all British troops had now left Wolfheze, bu there was no danger from that direction during the morning.

Brigade HQ received visitors during that morning when Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mackenzie and Robert Loder Symonds were sent ny Major-General Urquhart, newly escaped from Arnhem, to visit Hackett and request him to come to Division HQ if he could get away; otherwise Urquhart would come to see Hackett later. 'Shan Hackett was delighted that Roy Urquhart was back in command of the division; he had clearly found it irksome to work under Brigadier Hicks. He say: My feelings were that Roy was back and a firm hand was in charge at last. Things were looking tidier. I had no quarrel with the conduct of the operations now.

Hackett did not feel able to leave his headquarters as the morning progressed and news from his forward battalions worsened, and at 1.30p.m. Roy Urquhart arrived to see him. An importment discussion took place. The situation had deteriorated drastically since the 'things looking tidier' optimism of mid-morning. 156 Battalion's attack had fialed with heavy loss; the 10th Battalion was pinned doen, unable to make progess. The KOSB were still required to protect the glider landing zones. The glider lift was late. In short, the 4th Parachute Brigade had run out of steam and there were no fresh troops available to continue the attempt to move into Arnhem against an obviously powerful german defence.

Hackett suggested cutting his brigade's losses north of the railway in case German counter-attack and it was decided that the 4th Parachute Brigade would disengage and move to the south of the railway preparatory to munting a fresh attack into Arnhem from there. There were two main problems: the need to protect the landing zones for the glider landing and the high railway enbankment running between the brigade and Oosterbeek which only had two proper crossing points for vehicles and guns:at Oosterbeek Hoog Station and Wolfheze Station. One of those crossings had to be captured. Urquhart said that he would instruct Brigadier Hicks to secure the Oosterbeek Hoog crossing with troops from Oosterbeek; in fact, Hicks arrived during the discussion and confirmed that he would carry out the task. Hackett's staff prepared the orders for the 10th and 156 Battalions to start their withdrawal; the KOSB would have to remain where they were until the gliders arrived. Roy Urquhart climbed up the railway embankment and slid down the other side to his jeep. It was only the width of the railway line that separated the 4th Parachute Brigade from comparative safety of Oosterbeek. The situation of the 4th Parachute Brigade was ripidly becoming more dangerous while these unrealistic plans were being made. Reports from Dutch volunteer informants indicated that poweful German forces were closing in from the west the brigade's rear more quickly than previously been though. This brought a new urgency to the plan to move the brigade souht of the railway. There was no time for the Airlanding Brigade to prepare its attack on the Oosterbeek Hoog Station crossing. Hackett's brigade untils would have to disengage and make for Wolfheze crossing at once, before the Germans coming from the west reached it. That crossing point was two and a quarter miles away from the furthest of Hackett's untils, the 10th and 156 Battalions to disengage from close contact with the Germans and for KOSB, who would have to stay and defend the landing zone for the glider lift which had not yet arrived. The scene was set for a period of extreme danger of the 4th Parachute Brigade.